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The Battle of France in 1940 was effectively decided in the favour of Germany after their successful crossing of the Meuse River in the 
Ardennes region of France and Belgium. This was a strategically vital 
point both to the defence of France and the overall German operational 
plan as success in crossing the Meuse would allow the Wehrmacht to 
advance quickly to the Channel coast of France. It was at this point that 
the Wehrmacht concentrated their forces in order to force a breakthrough 
and sow confusion and disorganisation within the Allied command, 
control and communications structure. The crossing of the Meuse was 
the only major example of relatively organised resistance faced by the 
Wehrmacht until Hitler’s infamous stop order when the Germans had 
reached the outskirts of Dunkirk. When attempting to cross the Meuse, 
the Germans faced poorly trained, led and motivated third-rate conscripts 
whose resistance quickly collapsed in the face of the German onslaught 
and a very short period of retreat quickly turned into a large-scale rout. 
The popular perception as to what caused this rout was the Luftwaffe’s 
application of tactical air power, particularly close air support, and the 
image is one of Ju-87 ‘Stuka’ aircraft acting with absolute freedom against 
Allied forces, conducting close air support missions across the battlefield 
in support of the German Army.2 
This misconception has partly arisen from the emphasis placed upon 
the role played by the Luftwaffe during the crossing of the Meuse river, 
and has been seen as applicable to the whole battle during May and June 
1940. Recent scholarship by the likes of John Buckley has, however, looked 
to revise the emphasis that has been placed on the role of the ‘Stuka’ and 
the decisiveness of its impact in the German success.3 German tactics in 
conducting close support were, and continue to be, misinterpreted. The 
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belief that the few close air support attacks conducted by the Luftwaffe 
were on an impromptu basis was fundamentally wrong, as they had been 
fully pre-planned during discussions the day before. 
This misinterpretation, however, provided the driving force for the 
Royal Air Force (RAF) to develop this capability and enhance their abilities 
in this area.4 It is necessary at this time to define several air power specific 
terms for clarity: close air support is the use of aircraft against front-line 
enemy troops in conjunction with land operations and requires close 
integration to prevent friendly fire casualties. Battlefield air interdiction is 
another form of tactical air support and applies to operations conducted 
by air forces away from, but having a direct tactical influence on, the 
battle. This is achieved through operations that seal off the battlefield 
from the enemy, preventing reserves and materiel from moving up to 
support operations being conducted. Finally, air superiority battles are 
fought to gain control of the skies over the battlefield to allow operations 
to be conducted. This does not, however, mean that enemy air forces will 
not be conducting operations of their own, but they will be at a severe 
disadvantage when they do.
 Whilst this paper will continue the work done by Buckley and others, 
it will explore how the myth of the role of the ‘Stuka’ came to take hold, 
particularly in Britain, after the Battle of France. The British Army suffered 
a catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Wehrmacht, this is particularly 
surprising when it is considered that in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms, the Allied forces in 1940 outmatched the Germans.5 The investiga-
tions conducted by the British in the wake of France were fundamentally 
flawed, exaggerating aspects of the fighting where it suited, and looking to 
justify the doctrine that they had applied. The investigations emphasised 
the lack of air support, and placed the blame squarely on the shoulders 
of the RAF. 
There are several possible motives behind the British Army’s desire 
to do this: the army did not fully comprehend the inherent flexibility of 
air power and the myriad ways in which it could influence a land battle. 
It was looking to protect itself and the morale of its officers and troops 
upon its disastrous return to Britain or it was fundamentally misguided 
that its tactics and doctrine had in fact been sound and they had been 
beaten by a better opponent. This paper will, however, argue that this 
move was a deliberate attempt to force the RAF’s hand in terms of army 
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air support, which it felt had been neglected throughout the inter-war 
and early Second World War periods. Through this calculated attack, 
tactical air support, particularly close air support, would be given greater 
emphasis and, as an end result, they would gain an Army Air Arm over 
which they would have full operational control. This would allow the army 
to provide to its ground troops the ‘correct’ form of air support to allow 
it to be successful in the field. It is from the British army’s investigations 
that we can see the myth of the ‘Stuka’ begin to emerge and which has 
only recently started to be revised.
The Air Fighting in France
The role of tactical air power during the Battle of France has been greatly 
over exaggerated. The traditional image of dive-bombing ‘Stukas’ attacking 
enemy troops with the ‘Jericho Trumpets’ wailing was only applicable to 
one small section of the front during the crossing of the Meuse at Sedan. 
Whilst this was an overwhelming success, it was only possible through 
the attaining of air superiority over this section of the Meuse in the days 
preceding the German Army’s advance. This was achieved through air 
interdiction missions that destroyed many Allied aircraft on the ground, 
combined with the diversionary attack mounted to draw the Allied forces 
into Belgium, which the Allied plan called for anyway.6 Other crossings 
of the Meuse were achieved with no air support whatsoever. A major 
example of this was Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division.7 
The RAF’s tactical air support force had undergone substantial reor-
ganisation whilst it was in France. It was originally two separate forces, 
the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) and the RAF Component of the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF). These forces had two distinct roles, 
the AASF was to use the advanced airfields in France to conduct strategic 
bombing raids against the German homeland, while the RAF Compo-
nent was to provide support to the BEF through interdiction missions, 
a role which had been agreed by the army. This was also the role which 
they had argued the RAF should play throughout the inter-war period 
and prior to the German invasion of France and the Low Countries.8 
After much discussion, these forces were combined to form the British 
6 Weinberg, G.L., A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II (2nd Edition) 
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Air Forces in France (BAFF), under the command of Air Marshal Sir 
Arthur ‘Ugly’ Barratt. BAFF was responsible for all air support conducted 
by the RAF in France and this support was not to be limited to British 
sections of the line.9 Barratt was the most senior RAF officer versed in 
air support, and had previously been an artillery officer and had been 
key in developing co-operation between artillery batteries and aircraft 
during the First World War.10 He had attended the army’s Staff College 
at Camberley and been the Commandant of the RAF’s School of Army 
Co-operation during the inter-war period.11 The German invasion saw 
the implementation of the Allied Dyle plan designed to secure the French 
industrial region and allow the fighting to take place as far in front of 
French soil as possible. It was in this region and not in the Ardennes 
Forest that the RAF conducted its interdiction missions. Whilst this 
was conducted ably by the RAF, there were problems in co-ordinating 
this with the BEF, as whilst the advanced headquarters of BAFF was 
closely located with the local French Commander at Chauny, it was not 
near the BEF’s headquarters as had been laid down in inter-war doctri-
nal publications.12 The Allied forces had recognised the German thrust 
across the Meuse against Sedan as the main point of their attack on 12 
May, two full days after the Germans had begun their drive through the 
Ardennes Forest.13 As the junior partner in the alliance in 1940, Barratt 
had to have permission from the French High Command to conduct 
air support operations in the Ardennes. Due to French insistence that a 
modern army utilising large formations of armoured and mechanised 
forces could not pass through the Ardennes at any great speed, this 
permission was not granted.14
The major action of the RAF at the Meuse came on 14 May when the 
Germans had had ample time to prepare anti-aircraft defences in the 
region. This anti-aircraft defence took the form of a protective umbrella of 
9 The National Archives (TNA) AIR 24/681, Minutes of a Conference held at Gen-
eral Headquarters on 17 January 1940 to discuss certain aspects in connection with 
the Royal Air Force in France and the Appointment of an Air Officer Command-
ing-in-Chief, the British Air Forces in France. 
10 Carrington, C., Soldier at Bomber Command (London: Leo Cooper, 1987), p. 7.
11 http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Barratt.htm [accessed 11 September 2014].
12 TNA AIR 35/354, BAFF Barratt’s Despatch, Appendix N Summary of Disposi-
tions and Operations of BAFF during Various Phases of the Land Battle, First Phase 
10-15 May 1940, Dispositions of BAFF, July 1940. TNA AIR 10/1794, Army Co-opera-
tion Report 1930, Part I.
13 Powell, Army Co-operation Command p. 93.
14 TNA AIR 35/354, BAFF Barratt’s Despatch, Part III: Work of BAFF Prior to Land 
Battle, July 1940.
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Messerchmitts.15 It had been decided on 13 May by Generals Georges and 
Gamelin that attacks would be made on the pontoon bridges spanning 
the Meuse the following day. The RAF were to conduct the first waves 
of attacks in the morning followed by the French later that afternoon.16 
The results of the morning attack were extremely poor: out of four waves 
of bomber attacks only one hit was claimed.17 The French Armée de l’Air 
was unable to provide the resources necessary to conduct the afternoon 
attacks and so the burden fell again to the RAF. Barratt was aware that 
after the morning’s attack the enemy would be on full alert and that 
he would be ordering his men on a suicide mission. Due to this, he 
approached the light bomber crews and asked for volunteers. All of the 
crews on duty that afternoon stepped forward. The effect this attack had 
on Barratt has been described by Victor Bingham: 
Even if not said in so many words, the sacrifices were made to prevent any fur-
ther invasion and to save Allied forces. Barratt knew it when he committed his 
BAFF forces, but he had little option. It has been said that it almost broke him.18
The attacks of that afternoon were an unmitigated disaster. Many of the 
Fairey Battle crews were set upon by ‘hordes of Messerschmitts … and 
destroyed. Others fell to Flak and many more were shot out of the sky on 
the way home’.19 Of the seventy-one aircraft that conducted the operation 
only thirty-one returned. In the five days of daylight operations conducted 
by the RAF they had lost half their bombers stationed in France.20 
The operations against the German bridgeheads on the Meuse were 
relatively chaotic due to the preparedness of the German anti-aircraft 
defences in the area and this is further highlighted by the high casualty 
rate suffered by the RAF during this one day operation. The majority 
of the air support operations conducted by the RAF in the advance to 
the Dyle were for military operations, relatively un-chaotic. Part of the 
reason for this was that German activity around Belgium was heavy 
15 Perett, B., A History of Blitzkrieg (New York: Stein and Day, 1983), p. 94.
16 Ellis, L.F., The War in France and Flanders (Uckfield: The Naval and Military Press, 
2004 [Her Majesty’s Stationery Office: London, 1953]), p. 55.
17 TNA AIR 41/21, The Campaign in France and the Low Countries September 
1939-1940, Military Summary, Bombing Operations near Sedan, 14 May. Cull, B., and 
Lander, B., with Weiss, H., Twelve Days in May: The Air Battle for Northern France and 
the Low Countries, 10-21 May, As Seen Through the Eyes of the Fighter Pilots Involved 
(London: Grub Street, 1995), pp. 122–3.
18 Bingham, V., Blitzed: The Battle of France May-June 1940 (New Malden: Air Re-
search Publications, 1990), p. 64.
19 Johnson, J.E., Full Circle: The Story of Air Fighting (London: Cassell Military Pa-
perbacks, 2001 [London: Chatto and Windus, 1964]), p. 116.
20 Ibid.
Powell, ‘The RAF’, usjch 16 (2015), pp. 63–74. 68
enough to convince the Allies that this was the centre of gravity of the 
invasion operation. As David Ian Hall has stated the Germans were too 
astute and polite to highlight to the enemy when they were making a 
fatal mistake.21 The fighting on the ground in France, however, was of 
an extremely chaotic nature, almost from the moment of the Germans 
arriving in force at the Meuse River until the stop that was ordered 
outside of Dunkirk. One of the major factors that made the fighting so 
chaotic was the sheer operational speed of the German advance. The 
French forces, and as a result the British as well, were thrown off bal-
ance by the sudden break-through at Sedan. The speed of the German 
armoured formations combined with a slow and cumbersome French 
command, control and communications system meant that they were 
never able to recover.22 Information sent from front-line formations had 
to be passed up the command chain. The operational speed of the Heer 
meant that by the time information had reached senior commanders it 
was already out of date.23 By the time action had been decided and passed 
down the command chain to the same front-line formations, the units 
were nowhere near their original position and the orders could not be 
acted upon. As the retreat continued, this situation became worse and 
acted as force multiplier for the Germans as they were advancing against 
a demoralised, uncoordinated and confused enemy.24 French morale 
was also seriously undermined after the Sedan attack. Troops in retreat 
spread panic amongst the reserves being deployed in an attempt to plug 
the gap caused by the German break-through and advance and in certain 
cases fell back with the troops they were meant to be supporting. The 
Germans also utilised the flood of civilians to hamper French defensive 
efforts. Floods of refugees hampered the French efforts to bring reserves 
up to form a defensive line and added to the already low morale of the 
infantry.25
The Allied forces would never recover from the initial shock they had 
received across the Meuse. The RAF flew further interdiction missions, 
attacking the extending German supply and communication lines, but 
these attacks were nothing more than a nuisance and could not prevent 
21 Hall, Strategy for Victory p. 53.
22 Powaski, R.E., Lightning War: Blitzkrieg in the West (Hoboken: Castle Books, 
2006), pp. 12–3.
23 Ibid., pp. 175–7.
24 Doughty, R.A., The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 
1919–1939 (Connecticut: Archeon Books, 1985), pp. 3. 
25 For more details on the civilian experience of the Battle of France see Diamond, 
H., Fleeing Hitler: France 1940 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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the rolling advance of the German Panzer divisions. During this advance 
the Luftwaffe returned to providing an interdiction role acting as guards 
for the open German flanks.
The relative inability of the RAF, and indeed the British Army, to 
prevent the Wehrmacht from sweeping through France and dominat-
ing Western Europe and the Channel ports had little impression on the 
British public in terms of how the RAF and air power in general were 
viewed. Whatever failings the RAF had, or would be claimed to have 
had were overshadowed by two major events in British history. The first 
was Operation DYNAMO: the evacuation from Dunkirk. This allowed 
the British military and government to claim a moral victory out of the 
disaster that was the Battle of France. The contemporary focus was on 
this rather than on the wider strategic context that would focus on why 
the British and French needed to be evacuated from the Dunkirk beach. 
The other event that followed shortly afterwards and allowed the idea 
of the airman being all-powerful was the Battle of Britain. The victory 
gained by the RAF during the summer of 1940 allowed the RAF and 
the government to cover up the problems that had been faced in France 
and again the strategic context behind the RAF having to fight such a 
battle against the Luftwaffe at all. In a war such as the Second World War, 
especially in Britain, the ‘victories’ of Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain 
played a much larger role in how air power and the RAF were seen by 
the public than the Battle of France.
The British Investigations
The investigations into the disastrous fighting began while the command-
ers of the RAF, Barratt, and the BEF General Lord Gort were still in France. 
Both had written lengthy despatches on the fighting and these documents 
highlight the differential thinking that existed between the two forces. 
Gort’s despatch also highlights how the army would use air support as 
a means to excuse their defeat. In Barratt’s opinion, the framework for 
conducting air support was theoretically sound but needed improvement 
in terms of centralisation and having an air force commander in overall 
operational command of all air forces in a given theatre.26 Gort, however, 
felt that only a protective umbrella of fighters could have prevented the 
26 TNA AIR 35/354, BAFF Barratt’s Despatch, July 1940, Part V — Conclusions and 
Recommendations, Command.
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isolated attack of British ground forces.27 This idea was pushed further 
with the full investigation launched by the British Army in June 1940 
conducted by General William Bartholomew. 
General Bartholomew was an unusual choice to head an investiga-
tion such as this, unless the army was looking for someone to find the 
‘correct’ reasons for their defeat. He was vehemently against the idea 
of an independent air force and joint operations. These views had also 
seriously affected his career prospects. It was believed that Bartholomew 
was one of the front runners to become Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff during the inter-war period but was transferred to India instead in 
order to avoid a total collapse in relations between the RAF and army. 
The Bartholomew Committee Report was flawed in several respects: it 
took evidence from only one RAF officer, those who formed the Com-
mittee demonstrated a lack of understanding of air power terms and 
how these related to operations in the field and a misreading of German 
tactics and operational doctrine.28 The report’s focus and indeed one of its 
conclusions demonstrated the blinkered way in which the army viewed 
air support. The report fundamentally misunderstood the interdiction 
operations conducted by the RAF and stated that the ground troops in 
France felt they had received no air support as they had only seen enemy 
aircraft in the skies above the front lines. The recommendation of the 
report was that the RAF must fly the flag: that is they must be seen by 
friendly ground troops in order to boost morale, particularly if they 
were under attack from enemy aircraft. In the opinion of the Commit-
tee this should be done at the expense of other tasks. In the view of the 
Committee, the RAF was not conducting the correct form of air support 
by conducting interdiction missions. The report also believed that the 
air support attacks conducted by the Luftwaffe were impromptu and a 
reaction to the operational situation faced as the drive to and across the 
Meuse unfolded. The Committee also fundamentally misunderstood 
German land tactics, particularly how the new ‘Blitzkrieg’ method of 
waging war looked to bypass major obstacles and probed the enemy’s 
line looking for weak spots through which it could pass. It is difficult to 
discern if this misunderstanding was deliberate or not, however, it did 
allow the report to pronounce that British tactics were sound.29
27 TNA CAB 106/246, Despatches of the Operations of the British Expeditionary 
Force, 3 September 1939–19 June 1940.
28 Powell, Army Co-operation Command, p. 113. Place, T.H., ‘British Perceptions of 
the Tactics of the German Army, 1938-1940’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 9, 
No. 3 (July 1994), pp. 495–519.
29 TNA CAB 106/220, The Bartholomew Committee Final Report, 1940.
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The only air officer to give evidence to the Committee was Air Vice-Mar-
shal C.H.R. Blount who commanded the Air Component of the BEF 
during the fighting in France. There is no evidence that the testimony 
given had any bearing on the conclusions reached. Barratt was not con-
sulted and there are several possible reasons for this. As the head of all 
RAF forces in France, he may have been too distant from the tactical 
situation on the ground to be aware of how the air support system actually 
functioned in the heat of battle, as an RAF commander, the potential of 
bias may have coloured his view of the performance of the RAF or, as 
this was primarily a land battle, one voice from the RAF was deemed 
to be enough. Despite these possible reasons, it is my opinion that the 
main reason behind Barratt’s omission from giving evidence was that the 
army, aware of the content of his despatch from France, did not want a 
senior RAF commander giving evidence that may implicate the BEF and 
its tactical and operational doctrine as the fundamental reason behind 
its defeat. The Bartholomew Report itself does not state whether they 
looked in detail at Barratt’s despatch, but it is fair to assume that they 
were aware of the conclusions presented in it at least.30 The Committee’s 
conclusions have come to impact on the memory of the Battle of France 
in a more fundamental way. There is a widely held belief that if the RAF 
had had a better tactical air support system to utilise in France then the 
German success could have been halted on the Meuse at Sedan. This 
stems directly from the conclusions reached in the Bartholomew Com-
mittee Report. This view, however, fails to take into account the overall 
strategy implemented by the Allies that was primarily of French design. 
This strategy was based on the experience of the First World War 
and the desire of the French to fight as far away from French territory, 
and their industrial heartland in the north-east, as possible. In order to 
prevent this the Allies planned to advance to the Dyle River in Belgium. 
The planning for this operation was severely hampered by the Belgian 
declaration on neutrality in 1936.31 This prevented staff talks between the 
French and Belgians and would hamper the co-ordination of defensive 
operations. Of more importance, however, were the operational implica-
tions of such a strategy. The Dyle Plan was based around the assumption 
that the Germans would attempt a repeat of their attack in 1914, sweeping 
through the Low Countries and advancing through northern France.32 
This was, in fact, the original German strategic plan, and was designed 
30 Ibid. 
31 Bell, P.M.H., The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (2nd Edition) (Har-
low: Pearson Education, 1997), p. 237.
32 Freiser, K.H., The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 2005), pp. 90–1.
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as a strategy that would yield limited success by occupying German 
territory and providing a position from which more decisive operations 
could be launched. The plans for these attacks, however, were discovered 
after Major Helmuth Reinberger carrying them became lost and crash-
landed in Belgium. This caused a great panic amongst Adolf Hitler and his 
General Staff and work began on a new plan for which many ideas were 
suggested.33 General Gerd von Rundstedt put the one that was eventually 
employed in 1940 forward. The Allies used the captured German plans as 
confirmation that their strategy was sound. The change in strategy meant 
that all Allied operations were conducted away from what Clausewitz 
has termed the centre of gravity, which was along the Meuse rather than 
Dyle River. The vast majority of the air support operations conducted by 
the Allies were to support the advance to the Dyle. The Allied realisation 
of the centre of gravity of the German operation was far too late for any 
air support action conducted to have a decisive effect on the German 
advance. That any was conducted around Sedan was done out of sheer 
desperation and the requirement to try anything to prevent the flow of 
German armour, reserves and materiel across the Meuse. 
The Impact of the Bartholomew Report on the 
Development of Tactical Air Power in Britain
The Bartholomew Report forced the RAF in Britain into a difficult polit-
ical position with regards the development of tactical air support and 
its future relations with the army. The RAF now felt it had to at least be 
seen to be developing a more robust and influential air support capa-
bility. The RAF’s major fear if they did not at least appear to be taking 
air support more seriously was that the army would continue to push 
for, and eventually gain, their own army air arm, over which they would 
have full control. This desire was based on the army’s misunderstanding 
that the Luftwaffe was subordinate to the German army. If this situation 
occurred, it would likely lead to calls for the RAF to be disbanded as an 
independent force and for air resources to be reorganised into the system 
that had prevailed during the First World War where there was a Royal 
Flying Corps attached to the army and a Royal Naval Air Service attached 
to the Royal Navy. In order to prevent this from happening, discussions 
33 Powaski, Lightning War, pp. 3–6. Keegan, J., The Second World War (London: 
Pimlico, 1997), p. 48.
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took place in the autumn of 1940 between the RAF and army over the 
best way to enhance the air support capabilities of the RAF, and improve 
the extremely strained relations between the two services. 
The result of these discussions was the creation of Army Co-operation 
Command, with Barratt as the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-
in-C). The army were happier with the appointment of Barratt than the 
RAF as he was deeply unpopular amongst the higher commanders of the 
RAF.34 The army actively worked against the RAF to keep Barratt as the 
AOC-in-C of Army Co-operation Command when first the RAF and 
second Winston Churchill attempted to remove him from his position 
in 1941.35 The remit for this new Command was to work closely with 
the army, not only to improve its understanding of the various roles 
air power could play at the tactical level of war, but to develop an air 
support capability that would give the army the confidence needed to 
conduct operations when it returned to the continent. The idea of Army 
Co-operation Command was a War Office and not an Air Ministry idea 
but, through its creation, it would allow the RAF to appear to be taking 
air support more seriously, whilst still allowing it to prosecute the air 
war in what they believed to be the correct use of air power: a strategic 
campaign against the German homeland.
Despite the restrictions faced by Army Co-operation Command caused 
by the way in which it was created by the RAF, there were some devel-
opments in tactical air support achieved in Britain.36 The Command 
worked closely with the School of Artillery to develop the Air Obser-
vation Post concept, where aircraft located in friendly territory would 
spot and correct the fall of shot for artillery batteries on the ground.37 A 
system that allowed front line troops to request impromptu air support 
was also developed, refined and codified into doctrine. This system also 
allowed those allocating the support to advise the various formations if 
they would or would not be receiving the support requested. This theo-
retical system would then be further refined in the light of operational 
experience gained through fighting in the Western Desert and North 
Africa. Army Co-operation Command also worked closely with the army 
in Britain, greatly improving relations between the two services to a level 
that could not have been imagined in June 1940. The restrictions faced by 
34 Imperial War Museum Carrington Papers 81/11/6.
35 Powell, Army Co-operation Command, pp. 148–52.
36 Powell, M., ‘The Battle of France, Bartholomew and Barratt: The Creation of Army 
Co-operation Command’, forthcoming Air Power Review Vol. 18, No. 1, (Spring 2015).
37 Powell, M., ‘A Forgotten Revolution?: Army Co-operation Command and Artil-
lery Co-operation, 1940-42’, Canadian Military History Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter 2014), 
pp. 71–88.
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Army Co-operation Command, however, meant that the army was still 
frustrated in its desire for an operational air support force. Army Co-op-
eration Command was an experimental and developmental Command 
and could not test its ideas in battle. This meant that it was always last 
in the order of priority for resources when these demands were placed 
against those of the operational RAF Commands.38
Conclusion
The BEF looked to place the blame for their defeat in France squarely on 
the shoulders of the youngest British service, the RAF. That they were 
largely successful in this is reflected in how tactical air power is seen to 
have impacted upon the Battle of France. Until recently, the view of his-
torians in this area was the same as that largely held by the general public: 
close air support as delivered from specialist aircraft was a major factor 
not only in the speed of the German advance but also the completeness 
of their victory. This view has taken hold due to the actions of the British 
Army in the wake of the Battle of France through their false emphasis 
on the impact of tactical air power during the fighting. As this paper has, 
however, demonstrated, this was a deliberate misunderstanding by the 
army in order to place the blame for the defeat away from them and the 
methods employed during the fighting. This put the RAF under great 
political pressure to create an organisation they were not comfortable 
with in Army Co-operation Command. Whilst the creation and work 
of Army Co-operation Command improved the relations between the 
RAF and army, which were extremely strained in the wake of the Battle 
of France, there were still huge disagreements between the two services 
over fundamental air support issues. This included the best organisation 
to conduct air support when the army returned to the continent. The 
army felt that the natural home for any operational air support force 
was Army Co-operation Command, whereas the RAF argued it should 
be created and developed within Fighter Command. This was where 
the new tactical air support force, 2nd Tactical Air Force, was eventually 
created and developed.39
38 Powell, Army Co-operation Command, p. 169.
39 1st Tactical Air Force referred to the force used to conduct air support operations 
in the Western Desert and North Africa.
